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Of Shining Knights and Cunning
Pettifoggers: The Symbolic World of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Nelson P. Miller and Joan Vestrand*
This article offers a coherent ethicalperspective on the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The legal
profession bases its Model Rules on assumptions about lawyers, their
clients and adversaries, the authority to which lawyers appeal, and
the economy in which they practice. Citing in support every Model
Rule, this article exposes the rich symbolic assumptions underlying
the Rules and concludes that it is through this symbolic world that the
Model Rules are best understood. This article includes a description
of the normative economy on which the symbolic world of the Model
Rules is based.
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Models of Normative Interpretation

Now is a good time to consider what the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct say about the legal profession. The way in which
the Rules describe or conceive of lawyers, their clients, the world in
which their clients operate, and the economy in which lawyers practice
all shed light on the profession. There are remarkable challenges and
opportunities within law and the legal profession. The public questions
our values, morals, ethic, commitment, and purpose-not to mention our
billing rates and practices. We question ourselves. The best answers
may be the pragmatic rather than the theoretical ones. People need
lawyers. They continue to retain and pay us. But so pragmatic an
answer still begs us to consider what makes the legal profession function
as a prelude to our learning how lawyers can practice with greater
meaning and purpose. These considerations will help us to understand
how we can encourage the next generation of lawyers in their
professional responsibility.
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of what
lawyers do and how well they do it, it might be useful to have a fresh
model for interpretation. Looking at the Model Rules as data on the
profession's nature, the question becomes what is the most useful
perspective from which to understand and appreciate the Rules as
emblematic of the profession's coherence? How should any system of
morality or ethics be understood to represent the deeper meanings of the
people or profession it governs? The question here is not whether a
certain sub-rule should be amended to modify discrete duties arising in
rare or narrow circumstances. It is instead how, through a study of the
Rules, we can take a useful view of ourselves as a profession.
Normative scholars have taken at least four different perspectives in
evaluating ethical systems:
(1) descriptive; (2) synthetic;
(3) hermeneutic; and (4) pragmatic.' A descriptive view focuses on an
ethical code's substantive detail.2 A synthetic view looks at the
comprehensiveness and consistency of an ethical code.3 A hermeneutic
perspective considers the interpretive quality of an ethical codewhether it contains rules, elicits principles, and produces paradigms.4 A
1. See, e.g., RIcHARD B. HAYS, THE MORAL VISION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 3
(1996) ("The four tasks interpenetrate one another, of course, but it is useful to
distinguish them for heuristic purposes.").
2. Id. ("The descriptivetask is fundamentally exegetical in character.").
3. Id. at 4 ("[W]e must move on to ask about the possibility of coherence among
the various witnesses. When we ask this question, we move from the descriptive to the
synthetic task. Is it possible to describe a unity of ethical perspective within the diversity
of the canon?").
4.

Id at 209-09.
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pragmatic view measures effectiveness based on what the ethical code
actually produces. 5 The question is which of these perspectives is the
most useful in understanding and appreciating, and perhaps better
shaping, the Model Rules.
The Model Rules work fairly well as a descriptive ethic. The Rules
are plainly proscriptive, prohibiting such acts as commingling,6
misrepresentation,' improper influence, 8 and a variety of other bad acts.
The Rules provide lawyers with a reasonably precise understanding of
what they are not to do in commonly encountered circumstances, such as
conflicts of interest, 9 solicitation,' ° and obstruction.1" The Rules are also
prescriptive in that they provide reasonable guidance to lawyers on what
they are to do in a variety of circumstances. For example, the Rules
instruct lawyers on the safekeeping of client funds and property 12 and on
the requirements for diligence,1 3 competence, 14 independent judgment, 5
confidentiality,1 6 and so on.
Taken together with the drafters' comments, the Model Rules
generally do not lack descriptive detail. There are, however, some areas
in which the Rules could be more precise. For example, few details are
provided on how to adequately screen a disqualified lawyer from a
matter so as to avoid imputed disqualification of other members of the
firm. 7 Yet, even on that issue, the comments provide reasonably
5. Id. at 7, 313.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (2006) ("A lawyer shall hold
property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer's own property.").
7. Id. at R. 4.1 ("(A] lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
material fact to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client ...").
8. Id. at R. 3.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not.., seek to influence a judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law ...").
9. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.8 (entitled "Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific
Rules").
10. See id. at R. 7.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time
electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain .... ).
11. See id. at R. 3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not... unlawfully obstruct another party's
access to evidence ....).
12. Id. at R. 1.15(a) ("Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded.").
13. Id. at R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
14. Id. at R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
15. Id. at R. 5.4 (entitled "Professional Independence of a Lawyer").
16. Id. at R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client ....).
17. Id. at R. 1.11 (b)(1) (stating that no lawyer in a firm with a disqualified former
public officer may undertake the representation unless "the disqualified lawyer is timely
screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
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detailed guidance. 18 While the Rules provide prescriptive guidance, a
descriptive study of the Rules, by itself, falls short as a measure of their
overall effectiveness. Description has little to do with circumspection
and perspective, and even less to do with normative evaluation.
Viewing the Model Rules from the perspective of a synthetic system
also fails to adequately measure their effectiveness. Scanning their table
of contents shows that the Rules cover a broad and comprehensive range
of duties and responsibilities in an organized fashion. The Rules are also
by and large consistent rather than contradictory. Surely tensions exist
within the rules. For example, the duty of confidentiality conflicts, to
some degree, with a lawyer's ability to disclose information in order to
prevent client crime and fraud. 19 Similarly, the prohibition against
frivolous claims and defenses must be reconciled with the equallyrecognized duty to preserve a client's constitutional right against selfincrimination. 2 ° Yet, the Rules attempt to embrace and balance these
tensions, rather than disregard or dismiss them. The Rules are to be read
together so that lawyers are not left to choose between conflicting
provisions.
Despite such comprehensiveness and consistency, an
analysis of the Rules based on these attributes is not an adequate measure
of their effectiveness. This type of analysis establishes only that
whatever the Rules are doing, they are doing it consistently. This
approach leaves unanswered the important question of whether the Rules
are functioning as effectively as possible in their aim as a normative
system.
The Model Rules are also an effective hermeneutic system because
they lend themselves well to interpretation. They not only state clear

therefrom"); see also id. at R. 1.0(k) ("'Screened' denotes the isolation of a lawyer from
any participation in a matter ....).
18. Id. at R. 1.0 cmt. 9 (explaining that screening requires "such procedures as a
written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm
personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter,
written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication
with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to
firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to
the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.").
19. Compare id. at R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client .. "),with id. at R. 1.6(b) ("A lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary" to prevent death or substantial bodily harm or to prevent crime or fraud using
the lawyer's services.).
20. Compare id. at R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding...
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous ....), with id. at
R. 3.1 ("A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding or the respondent in a
proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding
as to require that every element of the case be established.").
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rules, but also illustrate clear principles such as the duty of loyalty2 1 both
during and after the representation 2 and the duties of independence,2 3
honesty,24 and discretion.2 5 The Rules also provide lawyers with
objectives for things like pro bono service 26 and remediation of client
wrongs, 27 which further suggests rule- and principle-based possibilities
and paradigms-common
components of any comprehensively
hermeneutic system. As useful as they are, hermeneutics alone also fail

to provide a full and complete perspective on the Model Rules.
Hermeneutic rules and principles are too didactic and the paradigms too
bound by context, character, and time to achieve this article's broader
objective of gaining a coherent and synthetic perspective on the
profession.
The Model Rules also seem fully adequate as a pragmatic solution.
Indeed, the democratic process by which the American Bar Association
enacts the Rules practically ensures their pragmatic nature. 288 A king
ruler would probably have imposed a different set of Rules-perhaps
more idealistic and utopian or perhaps more regulatory and constraining.
The fact that the profession regulates itself through a representative body
that debates and acts on rule recommendations ensures that the Rules
comport rather neatly with what lawyers are actually willing to do. The
Bar's willingness to follow the Rules is evident in their having been
adopted or at least used as a model in a substantial majority of
jurisdictions.29
21. See id. at R. 1.7 (entitled "Conflict of Interest: Current Clients"); id. at R. 1.8
(entitled "Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules"); id. at R. 1.8(f) ("A
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client" except under certain conditions.).
22. See id. at R. 1.9 (entitled "Duties to Former Clients").
23. See id. at R. 2.1 ("[A] lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment .... ); id. at R. 5.4 (entitled "Professional Independence of a Lawyer").
24. See id. at R. 4.1 (entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to Others").
25. See id. at R. 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation.").
26. See id. at R. 6.1 ("Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal
services to those unable to pay.").
27. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(3) (stating that a lawyer may disclose confidential
information "to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another").
28. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 37-38, 40-41
(7th ed. 2005) (describing the organization of the American Bar Association and its
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, as well as giving a brief history of
the promulgation and adoption of the Model Rules).
29. See id. at 40 ("Roughly forty states and other jurisdictions have adopted new
legal ethics rules patterned on the ABA Model Rules .. "); see also Gregory C. Sisk,
Iowa 's Legal Ethics Rules-It's Time to Join the Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 279, 280 n. 6
(1999) (stating that thirty-nine states have adopted ethics rules patterned after the ABA
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The fact remains, however, that the Bar's pragmatic adoption of and
efforts to enforce the Model Rules also fail as an adequate measure of the
Rules' effectiveness. The mere fact of the Bar's endorsement of the
Rules does little to help us understand, appreciate, and evaluate them.
Take into consideration, for example, the low esteem in which lawyers
are held despite the widespread adoption of these rules,3 ° or the relatively
infrequent enforcement of lawyer disciplinary rules. 3 ' Both could be
seen as indicative of the pragmatic failure of the Rules. Conversely, the
latter may be seen as evidence that the Rules work quite well. The
question is how does one evaluate empirical evidence regarding the
Model Rules without having an understanding and standard against
which to evaluate? Ethical systems must in some respect be judged from
outside the pragmatic experience of the practitioner because judging
solely by pragmatic experience is not ethics but description. Ethics
connotes comparison to a superior, or at least minimally acceptable,
normative standard.
This brief survey brings us to one last possibility: an evaluation of
the Model Rules based on whether they articulate a meaningfully
symbolic system. Individual rules, subsets of rules, and the Rules as a
whole create a symbolic view of lawyers, clients, adversaries, and the
legal system that is based on collective assumptions made by the Rules'
drafters about each of these categories. One cannot regulate a lawyer
without assuming that the lawyer possesses certain characteristics. To
make a rule without making certain assumptions about lawyers in general
is to regulate in a vacuum-without problem, premise, or purpose. The
same consideration holds true for clients: to enact a lawyer-conduct
regulation absent assumptions about the client is vacuous. Clearly, the
rule-makers must also have made certain assumptions about the elements
of a lawyer's world, such as clients, adversaries, and the professional
marketplace, before attempting to regulate the lawyer's conduct towards
these elements. Identifying these symbolic assumptions enables a
meaningful study of the Rules. Indeed, what better way to understand
and synthesize the Rules than to consider their unexposed foundational
assumptions? Simply identify the underlying assumptions upon which
Model Rules and that other states appear prepared to adopt similar rules).
30. See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising:
Public Images and the IrresistibleAristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325,
325-26 (1996) (explaining that lawyer corruption, greed, and selfishness contribute to the
profession's poor image).
31. See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liabilityfor
Failure to Prevent Harm to OrganizationalClients Through Disclosure of Constituent
Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETMcs 597, 660 (1998) ("[G]iven the infrequency of
enforcement of professional conduct rules, it is safe to assume that those rules have
marginal effect on lawyer behavior ... ").

2006]

OF SHINING KNIGHTS AND CUNNING PETTIFOGGERS

the Rules are based and a symbolic perspective on the profession
emerges.
II.

The Symbolic World of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The Model Rules are designed for application in a hazardous,
foreboding, conflict-ridden and, in an important sense, chivalric world.
Consider, for example, the Rules against conflicts of interest. 32 The rules
governing conflicts of interest reflect the value placed on loyalty to the
client and on independent judgment by the legal profession. In fact,
these are the principles that the conflict of interest rules might be said to
represent.
The proscriptions against conflicts of interest demand
generally that a lawyer's allegiance be to a single client.33 These rules
also require that a lawyer's advice to that client be free from outside
influence, including influence arising from personal interest.34 Why does
the profession so deeply value loyalty and independence? What are we
assuming about our professional world when we require lawyers to
embrace these concepts?
Loyalty and independence from outside
influence take on critical importance in situations of stress, adversity, and
challenge. It is in hazardous environments-like prisons, high-crime
areas, or the barbaric lands that surrounded feudal estates in times pastthat allegiance and loyalty (whether to leader, gang, or lord) become
vital. The Rules' demand for independent allegiance is based on
symbolic assumptions about the nature of a lawyer's world-a world of
conflict and battle in an adversarial and contentious setting.
Thus, there exists the assumption that the Model Rules relate to a
perilous world of substantial danger and risk in which participants
(clients) require loyal and zealous support in order to best protect their
interests and assure positive outcomes. Clients are a class set apart by
their need for legal representation. This, in itself, speaks volumes about
the unusual world in which clients find themselves. At first blush, it may
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2006) (entitled "Conflict of
Interest: Current Clients"); id. at R. 1.8 (entitled "Conflict of Interest: Current Clients:
Specific Rules"); id. at R. 1.9 (entitled "Duties to Former Clients"); id. at R. 1.10
(entitled "Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule"); id. at R. 1.11 (entitled
"Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and
Employees"); id. at R. 1.12 (entitled "Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other ThirdParty Neutral"); id. at R. 1.18 (entitled "Duties to Prospective Client"); id. at R. 2.3(b)
("When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to
affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the
evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.").
33. Id. at R. 1.7(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.").
34. See, e.g., id. at R. 5.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.").
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appear amusing to compare our legal system to a perilous feudal society
or to attribute to lawyers a chivalric loyalty. However, any dubiousness
in this regard evaporates when one considers the manifold legal dangers
that clients face.35
In truth, the physical, mental,36 emotional,3 7
3
8
39
financial, and familial perils of modem phenomena, like divorce, loss
of child custody, job loss, financial liability, business failure, home loss,
bankruptcy, arrest, conviction, incarceration, and capital punishment, are
no less hazardous or traumatic than were the dangers faced in ancient or
feudal society. The symbolic world of the Model Rules treats the legal
system as a treacherous
environment in which clients are best protected
40
by a lawyer ally.
The Model Rules correctly view these dangers as animate, directed,
and potent. In the symbolic world of the Rules, threats do not merely lie
latent but rather stalk 4 ' and pursue 42 the client, sometimes even from
within a client organization.43 There is the rare client who seeks
preventive counsel-perhaps to avoid commission of a crime44 or breach
of a contract. The vast majority of law practice, however, involves the

35. See id. at pmbl. cmt. 13 ("Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of
society.").
36. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 1 ("[A] severely incapacitated person may have no
power to make legally binding decisions.").
37. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 7 ("[A] lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis
of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the
client.").
38. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.8(e) ("A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation ....).
39. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.14(b) ("[T]he lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including.., seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator or guardian.").
40. See, e.g., id. at R. 6.1 cmt. 2 (recognizing "the critical need for legal services that
exists among persons of limited means").
41. See, e.g., id. at R. 3.8(c) (" The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ...not seek to
obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights ...").
42. See, e.g., id. at R. 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ...refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause ...").
43. See id. at R. 1.13(b) ("If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to
act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to
the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.").
44. See id. at R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.").
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45
client who has already committed the crime or breached the contract;
therefore, the Rules must assume that loss, liability, and incarceration are
of real threat to most clients. It is precisely because of these real and
significant threats that the Rules assume that clients need a lawyer who
possesses the requisite competence and diligence.46 If the stakes were
not what they are, perhaps some lesser standard would suffice. Instead,
the stakes are high-literally life or death in some situations and
imminent failure or fortune in others. The perils attendant to such harms
are commonly so novel and difficult 47 that they create tales that are
compelling enough to warrant valuable literary rights.4 8 The Rules'
symbolic assumption of a perilous world accurately reflects the reality of
both the client's condition and the lawyer's professional environment.
Another assumption underlying the Model Rules is that the perilous
symbolic world in which lawyers and clients operate is neatly divided
between good and evil, right and wrong, and truth and falsity. The Rules
clearly recognize that there is such a thing as truth. While the principle
of truth is simple and straightforward, it has, nonetheless, presented a
great challenge to many, even those of great influence, through the ages.
The Rules require honesty and full disclosure to a client 49 and prohibit
false statements to prospective clients in advertising communications.5 °
Similarly, the Rules require honesty and fair dealing with adversaries 5'
and candor to the tribunal, including disclosure of adverse controlling
law to an otherwise uninformed tribunal.52

45. See id. at R. 3.1 ("A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.").
46. See id. at R. 1.1 (entitled "Competence"); id. at R. 1.3 (entitled "Diligence").
47. See id at R. 1.5(a)(1) (noting that "the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved" are considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee).
48. Id. at R. 1.8(d) ("Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a
portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation.").
49. See id. at R. 1.0(e) ("' Informed consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct."); id. at R. 1.4(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall ...promptly inform
the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed
consent, as defined in R. 1.0(e), is required by these Rules ....); id. at R. 1.4(b) ("A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
50. Id. at R. 7.1 ("A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.").
51. Id. at R. 3.4(b) ("A lawyer shall not... falsify evidence, counsel or assist a
witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by
law ....).
52. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(2) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly ... fail to disclose to the
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For all of the academic world's contrary positivist, realist, and
relativist writing, the symbolic world of the Model Rules assumes the
objectivity of truth and falsehood. The world in which the Rules exist is
also a somewhat chaotic place in which the smallest cause can produce
the greatest result-a phenomenon known as the "butterfly effect."53
Some of the Rules apply only in cases of "substantial" circumstances,
"reasonable" conduct, 54 or "significant" risks, 55 suggesting a cumulative
model that permits or excuses minor transgressions with minimal effects.
Yet, many of the Rules are not so limited and apply with equal force to
even the smallest transgression. For example, not even one dollar may
be commingled,56 surcharged,5 7 or miscalculated.58 Not even a single
false claim or defense is excused, 59 and not a word to a tribunal may be
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel ...").
53. See id. at R. 1.0(1) ("'Substantial' when used in reference to degree or extent
denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance."). For examples of use of the
word "substantial" throughout the Model Rules, see id. at R. 1.6(b)(1) (discussing
"substantial bodily harm"); id. at R. 1.6(b)(2) (discussing "substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another"); id. at R. 1.8(c) (prohibiting lawyers from
soliciting "any substantial gift from a client"); id. at R. 1.8(d) (prohibiting lawyers from
obtaining literary rights that are "based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation"); id. at R. 1.11 (a)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if he
has "participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee" in the
matter); id. at R. 8.3(a) (addressing Rule violations that raise a "substantial question" as
to a lawyer's fitness).
54. See id. at R. 1.0(h) ("'Reasonable' or 'reasonably' when used in relation to
conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent
lawyer."). For examples of use of the word "reasonable" throughout the Model Rules,
see id. at R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with "reasonable diligence" when representing
a client); id. at R. 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply with all "reasonable requests
for information" from clients).
55. For examples of use of the word "significant" throughout the Model Rules, see
id. at R. 1.7(a)(2) (discussing when a "significant risk" creates a concurrent conflict of
interest); id. at R. 1.10(a) (discussing when a "significant risk" requires that a conflict be
imputed on all lawyers in a firm); id. at R. 7.3(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting
business when his own pecuniary gain is a "significant motive").
56. See id. at R. 1.15(b) ("A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client
trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but
only in an amount necessary for that purpose.").
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) ("[I]n
the absence of disclosure to the contrary, it would be improper if the lawyer assessed a
surcharge on these disbursements over and above the amount actually incurred unless the
lawyer herself incurred additional expenses beyond the actual cost of the disbursement
item.").
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2006) ("Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating
the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client
and the method of its determination.").
59. See id. at R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous ...").
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false and untrue whether or not it is material. 60 These prohibitions
recognize that a client's interests can be irreparably harmed and
prejudiced by even the smallest of transgressions related to truth,
honesty, candor and fidelity. The Rules appropriately require lawyers be
hyper-vigilant in these situations and circumstances.
It is only by recognizing the nature of the world in which clients
operate that a student of the law can fully grasp and appreciate the Model
Rules and their significance. For example, if the client's world posed
minimum hazard and risk, the Rules would make little sense. Given the
assumptions of danger and risk in the client's world, however, the
provisions seem obvious. Again, in the face of such peril, the need for
things like allegiance, competence, and diligence is clear.
There is no compelling evidence that the assumptions upon which
the Rules are based are incorrect. To the contrary, the hazards that loom
are as palpable as the iron bars behind which lawyers often counsel their
clients. A system of professional rules that assumed that the client's
risks were ephemeral, that his world was sanguine, and that his fears
were nothing but paranoia would be more fitting to a Buddhist retreat
than an urban 'office. The symbolic assumptions about the client's
environment which underlie the Rules are insightful, accurate, and astute,
and they properly serve as a foundation for the standards of professional
responsibility.
III.

The Model Rules' Symbolic Lawyer

In addition to assuming that the legal system operates in a symbolic
world, the Model Rules also assume that the rules will regulate a certain
kind of symbolic lawyer. The foundational assumption in this regard is
that the symbolic lawyer is corruptible, or subject to temptation, in
professional practice and personal nature.6 1 What purpose would
elaborate rules prohibiting specific behavior serve if those governed by
the regulations were pure? The Rules assume that lawyers are not
perfect, are of fallible character, and that absent such proscriptions, they
would be less ethical.62 Indeed, the specific prohibitions within the Rules
neatly reflect the symbolic lawyer's natural tendency for corruption. The

60. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal ....).
61. See, e.g., id. at R. 8.4 (explaining that it is "professional misconduct" for a
lawyer to violate the Model Rules, commit a certain type of crime, act dishonestly or
fraudulently, prejudice the administration of justice, imply the ability to bribe judges, or
help a judge violate judicial ethics).
62. See id. at R. 8.5(a) ("A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject
to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct
occurs.").

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:4

Model Rules do not prohibit lawyers from acting like a loon because,
frankly, lawyers are not prone to do so. The Rules only proscribe and
address that conduct which lawyers are reasonably and foreseeably prone
to commit. One temptation to which lawyers are naturally suspect is an
inflated sense of ego and pride, which is addressed in the Rules'
prohibition
against making
unsubstantiated,
self-aggrandizing
comparisons of oneself to other lawyers.63 The Rules also suggest many
other evils that tempt and prey upon lawyers including committing
66 leveraging, 67 bribing, 68 concealing, 69
crimes64 or fraud, 65 lying,
obstructing,70 disparaging,7 1 disobeying,72 and delaying.73 Indeed, given
the breadth of the behaviors regulated and the depravity of the wrongs
addressed, the Rules appear to assume that the symbolic lawyer is not
only susceptible to corruption but actually prone to such an end.
A second foundational, symbolic assumption that the Model Rules
make about lawyers is that they are capable of meaningful selfexamination. The Rules assume that lawyers are perfectible, or at least
redeemable through education, introspection, and self-discipline. It is
assumed that when confronted by the prospect of their misconduct,
lawyers will conform by altering their behavior as required rather than by
justifying their bad acts. In this regard, the Model Rules are hortatory:
they warn, instruct and attempt to equip lawyers to make ethical
63. See id. at R. 7.1 cmt. 3 ("[A]n unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's
services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may be misleading ....
").
64. See id. at R. 8.4(b) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer ...").
65. See id. at R. 8.4(c) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation .....

66. Id.
67. See id. at R. 1.15 cmt. 3 ("[A] lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into
accepting the lawyer's contention.").
68. See id. at R. 7.6 ("A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal
engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or law firm makes a political
contribution or solicits political contributions for the purpose of obtaining or being
considered for that type of legal engagement or appointment.").

69. See id. at R. 3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not.., conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value.").
70. See id. ("A lawyer shall not.., unlawfully obstruct another party's access to

evidence ...").
71. See id. at R. 8.2(a) ("A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows
to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications
or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for
election or appointment to judicial or legal office.").
72. See id. at R. 3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not... knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal ....); id. at R. 8.4(d) ("It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice ...").
73. See id. at R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.").
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decisions through self-examination and self-criticism. 7 4 The necessity of
this assumption to the creation of an effective system of Rules is less
obvious than one might think. The Rules could have been drafted in a
style similar to that of a criminal code, which was to be read and applied
by ethics "prosecutors" (disciplinary authorities) as purely an
enforcement tool. Instead, the Rules were written to be read and
accepted by the putative lawyer-transgressors themselves. True, the
Rules require managing partners and supervisory lawyers to take
75
reasonable measures to ensure rule-compliance by subordinate lawyers
and non-lawyer assistants.76 However, the Rules also require subordinate
lawyers to know and comply with the Rules notwithstanding contrary
directives from their supervisors.77
The Model Rules are for the benefit of all lawyers, not merely for
ethics "prosecutors" or specialists. The Rules are far more than a set of
regulations upon which to administer discipline as an after-effect of a
violation; they are a system of education and deterrence. The symbolic
lawyer envisioned by the Rules is a self-examining, self-critical ethicist,
who is capable (if appropriately educated) of dealing properly with
deception by clients 78 and witnesses 79 and of avoiding things like false
advertising, 80 misrepresenting the lawyer's status to unrepresented
persons, 81 dealing unfairly with adversaries, 82 and making misstatements
74. See, e.g., id. at pmbl. (enumerating "A Lawyer's Responsibilities").
75. Id. at R. 5.1(a) ("A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm,
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct."); id. at R. 5.1(b) ("A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.").
76. Id. at R. 5.3 (entitled "Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants").
77. See id. at R. 5.2(a) ("A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.").
78. See id. at R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not.., assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .. ");id. at R. 1.16(b)(2) ("[A] lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if... the client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent...."); id. at R. 3.3(a)(3) ("If... the lawyer's client ...has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures . .
79. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3) ("If... a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures ...").
80. See id. at R. 7.1 ("A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.").
81. See id. at R. 4.3 ("When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.").
82. See id. at R.3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not... unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:4

to third persons. 83
In addition to assuming the lawyer's capacity for constructive selfcriticism, the Model Rules likewise assume that lawyers will seek to act
ethically because of an innate or trained propensity toward ethical
obedience, even in an environment of corruption. It is assumed that
lawyers will refer to and obey the Rules even when in the questionable
85 clients and witnesses, 86
company of perjurious 84 or repugnant
murderers, 87 other criminals, 88 or schemers. 89 The Rules assume that the
symbolic lawyer so desires to behave ethically that the lawyer is willing
to stand apart from the worst of influences. The Rules further assume
that the symbolic lawyer is not only willing to resist the bad but also
willing to sacrifice her personal rights and interests to advance the good
causes of her client. 90 The Rules' symbolic lawyer not only is fair and
reasonable in charging fees 91 but also has truly charitable and civic
aspirations.92 One illustration of this point is the Rules' exception to the
prohibition against in-person solicitation when the solicitation is for
charitable rather than pecuniary purposes.93 If it is in the nature of
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.").
83. See id. at R. 4.1(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person .... ").
84. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3) ("If... the lawyer's client.., has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures ...").
85. See id. at R. 1.16(b)(4) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw from representation
if "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant"); id. at R.
6.2(c) (stating that a lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment unless "the client or the
cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.").
86. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3) ("If... a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures ... ").
87. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(1) (stating that a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to
prevent reasonably certain death").
88. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(2) (stating that a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to
prevent the client from committing a crime" under certain conditions).
89. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(2) (stating that a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to
prevent the client from committing a... fraud that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another" under certain
conditions).
90. See id. at R. 6.1 (b)(1) (stating that a lawyer should provide legal services "at no
fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure
or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights").
91. Id. at R. 1.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.").
92. See id. at R. 6. 1(b)(1) (stating that a lawyer should provide legal services "at no
fee or substantially reduced fee to ... charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their
organizational purposes").
93. See id. at R. 7.3 ("A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time
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chivalry to forgo one's own interests to advance the interests of another,
the Rules assume some extent of that admirable quality. 94 The Rules also
encourage membership in legal services organizations 95 and
organizations devoted to legal reform,96 and they relax conflicts
requirements to encourage participation in court-annexed legal services
programs.97 The Rules expressly reject the assumption that lawyers
would routinely advance unsupportable causes 98 and instead require that
lawyers take the side of truth over falsity. 99 The Rules assume a
symbolic lawyer who desires ethical action and is willing to engage in
personal sacrifice to achieve this end.
The Model Rules temper the optimism of these symbolic
assumptions in at least one important respect by assuming that lawyers,
although capably self-critical and desirous of good, may require ethical
counsel to achieve these goals. The practice of law remains a selfregulating profession. 10 0
Lawyers grant themselves no regulatory
privilege against self-incrimination but must instead answer disciplinary
charges and correct disciplinary officials' misapprehension of their
innocence. 10 Proof that the Rules properly assume that lawyers may not
act ethically absent professional advice lies in the provision that allows
lawyers to
disclose confidences to the extent necessary to receive ethical
02
counsel.
electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.. )
(emphasis added).
94. See id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client
despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer ....).
95. See id. at R. 6.3 ("A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal
services organization ....
").
96. See id. at R. 6.4 ("A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an
organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the
reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer.").
97. See id. at R. 6.5(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer in a court-annexed legal services
program "is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the
representation of the client involves a conflict of interest").
98. See id. at R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous ...").
99. See id. at R. 8.4(c) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty .....
100. Id. at pmbl. cmt. 10 ("The legal profession is largely self-governing."); see also
id. at R. 8.5(a) ("A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct
occurs.").
101. See id. at R. 8.1(b) (stating that a lawyer in connection with a bar disciplinary
matter shall not "fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand
for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority").
102. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(4) (stating that a lawyer may reveal confidential information
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The underlying optimism with which the symbolic lawyer is viewed
is further tempered by the suggestion that, where possible, lawyers avoid
rather than attempt to manage bad influences. 10 3 These mixed symbolic
characteristics appear consistent with traditional moral and religious
notions of man's corrupted but perfectible nature and with the text- and
counsel-based transformative means by which man approaches that
perfection. Overall, the Rules' symbolic lawyer is readily understood to
be a fatally human, but also curiously divine, professional.
IV. The Model Rules' Symbolic Client
The Model Rules assume in their fabric a symbolic client: a person
who is alone and vulnerable and in need of a loyal ally. The Rules, while
directed to lawyers, must assume certain characteristics, capabilities, and
incapacities of clients in order to effectively regulate lawyer conduct.
For example, the Rules do not require lawyers to feed their clients
because clients are presumed capable of obtaining their own
nourishment.
In fact, the Rules expressly prohibit lawyers from
providing financial assistance for things10 4like a client's subsistence in
cases of pending or anticipated litigation.
Except in special circumstances, 10 5 the Model Rules assume that a
client is generally capable of protecting his own interests. The Rules do
not, for instance, routinely assume that clients are so incapable of
deciding their own matters that lawyers should decide those matters for
them. Clients, not lawyers, are to determine the objectives of their
representation and are to make key decisions regarding it, such as
whether to settle, enter a plea, go to trial, waive a jury, or testify.10 6 The
Rules require lawyers to counsel clients to the extent necessary for the
clients to make informed decisions. 10 7 This is because the symbolic
"to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules").
103. See id. at R. 1.16(b)(2) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if... the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent ....); id. at R. 6.2(a) ("A lawyer
shall not seek to avoid appointment ...[unless] representing the client is likely to result
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law ....
); see also id. at R.
1.2(b) ("A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment,
does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.").
104. Id. at R. 1.8(e) ("A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation....").
105.

See id. at R. 1.14 (entitled "Client with Diminished Capacity").

106. See id. at R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation ....).
107.

Id. at R. 1.4(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall ... promptly inform the client of any decision

or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in R.
1.0(e), is required by these Rules .. ");id. at R. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter
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client is presumed capable of making these decisions, but only with a
lawyer's help.
The Model Rules' presumption of client capability is in some
respects extraordinary. By and large, a similar presumption does not
exist in the case of a doctor and patient or even the case of an auto
mechanic and patron. In these situations, the service recipient's (i.e. the
patient's) active participation is often viewed as less vital, so the service
provider (i.e. the doctor) spends less time counseling him. To the
contrary, respectful counsel between a lawyer and client is considered
necessary to client decision-making, a right which is afforded to the
client because of the Rules' symbolic view of the client.
Though capable, the Model Rules' symbolic client suffers a
particular kind of vulnerability when in the absence of a lawyer ally. The
Rules require diligent and timely,'0 8 as well as competent10 9 and
licensed," 0 representation and lawyer-like conduct for all law-related
services.1 ' The Rules contain these requirements presumably because
without them clients would be at greater risk and disadvantage.
Although the Rules give decision-making authority to the client," 2 the
Rules also authorize lawyers to carry out their work with the implied
authority of the client. 1 3 Not only do lawyers act for clients, but also the
Rules permit lawyers and clients to become economic allies through
contingency fee agreements. 14 This symbolic alliance, though, is a
peculiar one in which the lawyer is not a typical business partner,
associate,' 15 or intimate acquaintance of the client." 6 Instead, the lawyer
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.").
108. See id. at R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.").
109. See id. at R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
110. Id. at R. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of
the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.").
111. Id. at R. 5.7(a) ("A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of law-related services ...").
112. Id. at R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation ...").
113. Id. ("A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly
authorized to carry out the representation.").
114. Id. at R. 1.5(c) ("A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for
which the service is rendered ...").
115. See id. at R. 1.8(a) ("A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client" except under certain conditions.); id. at R. 1.8(i) ("A lawyer
shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation
the lawyer is conducting for a client" except in certain forms.).
116. Id. at R. 1.80) ("A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship
commenced.").
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is a curiously independent ally.' 17 The Rules prohibit lawyers from
communicating ex parte with represented persons,1 18 based on the
assumption that represented persons are particularly vulnerable when
their counsel are not present. As a result of the same presumed
vulnerability, the Rules also prohibit lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers,' 1 9 conducting in-person solicitation, 120 advertising nominal
certification,

and using misleading trade names.

The Rules

proscribe these behaviors based on an assumption that clients cannot
manage their legal affairs absent the loyalty and allegiance of counsel.
Without counsel, clients are assumed to be alone in an unfamiliar and
hazardous world or divided from those who would ordinarily protect
them.
This is not to say that clients do not have natural allies. These allies
are often found in marital partners, business associates, parents, other
family members, agencies, and other professionals. The fact remains,
however, that many legal matters involve the disruption or termination of
these very relationships-the separation of the client from the people
who would ordinarily provide him with support. Examples include
divorce and child custody matters, business dissolution cases,
professional malpractice suits, will contests, and so on. The same family
members, friends, business associates, and professionals who were once
the client's confidants and supporters may become her adversaries. The
client is often divided from her natural allies by the very matter for
which she seeks legal counsel-hence the client's need for a lawyer ally.
The Model Rules also assume a symbolic client who is worthy of a
23
lawyer's sacrificial service. The Rules encourage pro bono service1
and require a lawyer to accept indigent representation, except for good

117. See id. at R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client ... ").
118. See id. at R. 4.2 ("[A] lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter ... ").
119. Id. at R. 7.2(b) ("A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for
recommending the lawyer's services" with certain exceptions.).
120. Id. at R. 7.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time
electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain" with certain
exceptions.).
121. Id. at R. 7.4(d) ("A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a
specialist in a particular field of law" with certain exceptions.).
122. Id. at R. 7.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other
professional designation that violates Rule 7.1 .").
123. See id. at R. 6.1 ("Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal
services to those unable to pay.").
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cause shown. 124 Further, the Rules prohibit withdrawal from a client's
matter if that withdrawal would have material adverse effects on the
client 125 and require a lawyer to continue to represent a client if ordered
to do so. 126 Even if a lawyer properly withdraws from a case, the lawyer
has a continuing duty to adequately protect the former client's
interests. 127 Additional client protections are afforded by the prohibition
against the artificial sale of a law practice1 28 and the rule that neither a
former client1 29 nor another lawyer 30 may restrict a lawyer's right to
practice or represent certain clients. Implicit in these rules is the
assumption that clients have value worthy of a lawyer's service-not just
some value but value that is greater than the lawyer's interests. In other
words, the Rules require that lawyers place a client's interests ahead of
their own. By requiring candid advice13 1 rather than the cheers of a
sycophant, the Rules also assume that lawyers should care more about
clients than about causes. It is not the conniving client whom the Rules
dictate we should deplore but the client's connivance. It is when a client
persists in a crime or fraud that the Rules permit, but notably do not
require, withdrawal. 132
The Rules presume that the client is
salvageable-that the lawyer-client relationship should be preservedeven when the situation cannot be salvaged. The symbolically valued
and salvageable client is in some respects an extraordinarily chivalric
assumption and one that is not typically the basis for relationships in the
business world outside of this noble profession.

124.

See id. at R. 6.2 ("A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a

tribunal....").
125. See id. at R. 1.16(b) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if...
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the
client ... ").
126. See id. at R. 1.16(c) ("When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.").
127. See id. at R. 1.16(d) ("Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests .....").
128. Id. at R. 1.17(a) (stating that a lawyer may sell a law practice only if the "seller
ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been
sold").
129. Id. at R. 5.6(b) (stating that a lawyer shall not participate in making "an
agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement
of a client controversy.").

130. Id. at R. 5.6(a) (stating that a lawyer shall not participate in making a partnership
agreement "that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship").
131. See, e.g., id. at R. 2.1 ("[A] lawyer shall.., render candid advice.").
132. See id. at R. 1.16(b)(2) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if... the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent ... ").
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The Model Rules' Symbolic Adversary

The symbolic world of the Model Rules takes a distinctive approach
to adversaries as well. Though much of what lawyers do involves
competition over substantial stakes, the Rules do not allow that conflict
to devalue the participants in a cutthroat competitive model. The Rules'
symbolic world values adversaries much as it requires lawyers to value
their own clients. The Rules require lawyers to act fairly toward their
adversaries 133 and include prohibitions on obstructing access to134 or
falsifying evidence,' 35 disobeying court rules, 136 engaging in frivolous
discovery, and failing to respond to legitimate requests. 137 At trial,
lawyers must continue to treat their adversaries properly by not alluding
to irrelevant matters,' 38 making assertions of personal knowledge, or
offering personal opinion in the role of an advocate. 139 These
prohibitions against lawyers speaking as a witness or acting as a judge
are really quite extraordinary when taken in context. The Rules, in
effect, recognize that lawyers are not to judge others' 40 -that judgment
of an adversary lies beyond the personal opinion or predilection of the
lawyer. The Rules further protect fairness in the adversary process by
prohibiting lawyers from placing witnesses beyond an adversary's
reach. 14 The Rules clearly seek to preserve the probability of a just and
133. Id. at R. 3.4 (entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel").
134. Id. at R. 3.4(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not... unlawfully obstruct another party's
access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value.").
135. Id. at R. 3.4(b) ("[A] lawyer shall not... falsify evidence, counsel or assist a
witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by
law ...").
136. Id. at R. 3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not. .. knowingly disobey an obligation under
the rules of a tribunal ....).
137. Id. at R. 3.4(d) ("A lawyer shall not.., make a frivolous discovery request or
fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery
request ....).
138. Id. at R. 3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not.., in trial, allude to any matter that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence ....).
139. Id. ("A lawyer shall not.. . assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused ....); see also R. 3.7 (entitled "Lawyer as Witness").
140. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.11 (distinguishing a lawyer's private practice role from a
lawyer's participation as a government officer); id. at R. 1.12(a) ("[A] lawyer shall not
represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or
as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral .. ");id. at R. 2.4(b) ("A lawyer
serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not
representing them.").
141. Id. at R. 3.4(f) ("A lawyer shall not... request a person other than a client to
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fair result in the legal system.
The overriding symbolic assumption within the Rules is that legal
contests are not meant to destroy adversaries but to prevent, deter,
resolve, and redress criminal, fraudulent, and other law-breaking
conduct. Though battles are waged, their purpose is not the destruction
of another but the condemnation of law and code-breaking conduct. The
Rules are in this respect redemptive. Every contestant is presumed
capable of absolving his own wrong, even if by conviction and sentence
or by liability and satisfaction of judgment. No contestant is so easily
condemned as to justify procedural corruption.
Indeed, because the real enemies are not the contestants but their
misconduct, the Rules' symbolic contest must be valorous. For example,
the Rules require lawyers to promptly bring an adversary's inadvertent
disclosure of confidential information to the adversary's attention. 142 In
addition, the Rules prohibit a lawyer from using means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person and from using methods of obtaining evidence that would
otherwise violate the rights of such a person.143 The Rules prohibit
lawyers from unduly influencing judges, jurors, and other officials, 44 and
from engaging in conduct that is disruptive to tribunals, 14 especially
through extra-judicial appeals to the masses. 146
Such conduct is
prohibited because contestants ought only to be justly condemned rather
than condemned by fiat or through influence. Prosecutors in particular
must refrain from condemning by unsupported accusations 147 and from
1 48
over-punishing through concealment of mitigating circumstances.
These symbolic assumptions are extraordinary in that even the worst of
adversaries are highly valued in their redemptive capacity and are
deemed to deserve fair treatment.

refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party . .
142. Id. at R. 4.4(b) ("A lawyer who receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the
document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.").
143. Id. at R. 4.4(a) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.").
144. Id. at R. 3.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not ...seek to influence a judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law ...").
145. Id. at R. 3.5(d) ("A lawyer shall not... engage in conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal.").
146. Id. at R. 3.6 (entitled "Trial Publicity").
147. Id. at R. 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ...refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause ....).
148. Id. at R. 3.8(d) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall... make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense ....
").
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The Model Rules' Symbolic Authority

From the broadest perspective, it could be concluded that the
foremost symbolic assumption within the Model Rules is that authority
judges lawyers. The fact that the Rules include a broad collection of
"thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots" presumes that judgment is
imminent-present at all times in all tasks a lawyer performs and all
relationships a lawyer maintains. Indeed, the Rules prohibit a lawyer
from knowingly speaking any false word to a tribunal, whether or not
material, though out of further respect for the
tribunal, only material
49
1
corrected.
affirmatively
be
need
misstatements
Such judgment-immanence is extraordinary and is also an
extraordinarily useful and commendable assumption. This is so in part
because in the workaday world outside of the professional rules, most
people operate on the opposite assumption-that judgment requires both
departure from the norm ("if everyone else is doing it, it must be okay")
and detection ("if I can get away with it, I should do it"). These kinds of
justifiers explain why drivers exceed the speed limit while continuously
monitoring for law enforcement. Though they are plainly in violation of
a meaningful law intended to preserve life and safety, speeding drivers
knowingly violate that law to the extent of detection and enforcement
because they presume no other judgment. To the contrary, the Rules
assume a world of lawyers who recognize and value the immanence of
judgment. They assume that lawyers will comply with the Rules because
the Rules are promulgated authority and not merely because the lawyers
could otherwise be caught and lose their law licenses. Yes, there are
enforcement mechanisms outside of the Rules, but the Rules themselves
say nothing about these mechanisms. The Rules merely say that their
violation is'professional misconduct' 5 0 -as if lawyers should know that
there is a value all its own to obeying authority without considering the
possibility of detection and enforcement. In the Model Rules' symbolic
world, authority is omnipresent.
The Model Rules also make certain assumptions regarding the
nature of that authority: that it is worth obeying and respecting. If, in
the symbolic world of the Rules, authority is immanent then it is also
eminent. Various Rules require lawyers to obey'15 and show respect for
authority rather than to insult or denigrate it.' 52 Other Rules prohibit
149. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal .... ).
150. See id. at R. 8.4(a) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to. . . violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ... ").
151. See id. at R. 3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not... knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal .... ).
152. See id. at R. 3.5(d) ("A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct intended to
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lawyers from encouraging those in authority to violate the rules
themselves.153 The symbolic value of these measures lies not in
cultivating a slavish attitude among lawyers to follow the rule of law no
matter how constituted, but in cultivating an appreciation for the
benevolence of authority generally-that without authority purposeful
social relationships, no less the practice of law, would be impossible. In
the Model Rules' symbolic world, authority has a value and eminence
worth honoring if not exalting.
54
The Model Rules also encourage lawyers to appeal to authority 1 to seek out authority in support of that which lawyers and clients require.
The symbolic assumption is again that authority is generally beneficent
and, moreover, that appeal to authority is an implicit condition of
meaningful society. The symbolic lawyer must appeal to authority to
serve client needs. But even so, in the symbolic world of the Rules, it is
the spirit or penumbra of authority which the symbolic lawyer must
accept as guide rather than the legalistic letter of authority. The Rules
repeatedly temper the symbolic lawyer's temptation to exhibit and
demand a rigid obedience with cautions that the rules are to be applied
when substantial and material. 155 In this symbolic world, authority is
immanent, eminent, beneficent, and sensitive.
VII. The Model Rules' Symbolic Economy
Taking these symbolic assumptions together, one can see that the
Model Rules presume a kind of symbolic economy in which lawyers
operate or ought to operate. Exposing the symbolic world of the Rules as
enables one to recognize more readily the distinct normative economy
that the Rules embody. The Rules presume that lawyers practice within
a market of personal, professional, institutional, and community values.
disrupt a tribunal."); id. at R. 8.2(a) ("A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer .... ").
153. See id. at R. 8.4(f) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... knowingly
assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of
judicial conduct or other law.").
154. See id. at R. 3.2 ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client."); id. at R. 3.3(b) (discussing disclosure to the
tribunal); id. at R. 3.3(d) ("[A] lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision .... ); see
also id. at R. 3.9 ("A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or
administrative agency in a non-adjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance
is in a representative capacity ... ").
155. See id. at R. 8.3(a) ("A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the

lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.").
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As individuals, we do not necessarily share normative economies. Some
of us do not value normative goods highly. Others of us do not accept
the infinite supply of certain normative goods or their infinite reward
when purchased. But the Rules suggest a normative economy by which
the profession already benefits-and would benefit further if recognized
and followed by a greater numbers of lawyers. That is, lawyers are quite
familiar with the normative economy but primarily by intuition, whereas
they are quite able to recognize the worldly professional economy about
which much has been said and written. What then are the characteristics
of the Rules' symbolic normative economy?
Given the judgment-immanence the Model Rules ascribe to
authority, the Rules' normative economy is unquestionably providential
rather than situational or probabilistic. The Rules presume that the fate
of a lawyer is not governed by chance or circumstance but instead by an
accumulation of the lawyer's judgments consistent with the normative
economy in which the lawyer operates-and that the more consistent the
lawyer, the more beneficent the judgment. No lawyer's fate is unfair
because the normative economy is based on an order intuitively known
to all of us and, moreover, because the goods within that economy are
unlimited in supply. The goods within the lawyer's normative economy
are distinct in another important respect: they have an innately more
lasting value than the goods of the worldly professional economy.
Another important distinction for the normative economy is that all of its
participants-lawyers, clients, and adversaries-are on equal terms
having equal power of purchase. Lawyers must therefore treat each
participant in the normative economy as if he were no less valuable to
the lawyer than the lawyer's own self, demanding in certain instances
sacrificial professional service.
The normative economy's currency is not so much the lawyer's
service as the lawyer's care, commitment, and concern within that range
of goods defined normatively. One could thus say that the normative
economy is perfectly efficient as to the lawyer's allocation of that
currency because the normative economy's regulator is omniscient. That
condition of omniscience alone demands a perfect obedience to the
regulator's authority within the normative economy. There is no sense
pretending or fooling around. Indeed, if the truth be known, it is not the
enforcement of the Model Rules that condemns lawyers but, given that
judgment is immanent, their promulgation. Under the Rules, lawyers
succeed not by acquisition, self-pursuit, or self-preservation but, in large
part, by self-abnegation. The normative economy bases itself on the
lawyer's transformation rather than on utilitarian or instrumentalist
regulation. The more a lawyer understands and follows the normative
economy, the more the lawyer is likely to succeed in the monetary or
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worldly economy at least in a manner in which success is relatively
assured, satisfying, and stable. The normative economy does not burden
lawyers but frees them to act in professionally meaningful and satisfying
manners. Clients tend to recognize and seek out the counsel of lawyers
who know the normative economy. On the other hand, lawyers who fail
to render normative advice to clients in need of it tend to lose their
clientele for lack of authority. The lawyer's obligation to render
normative counsel is consistent with clients' intuited belief in and
experienced embrace of the functionality and beneficence of the
normative economy. Clients understand that their success depends on
the normative economy more so than on the monetary imperatives on
which some lawyers operate outside of the normative economy.
VIII. Conclusion
To summarize, one could say that the Model Rules make the
symbolic assumption of a foreboding, conflict-ridden world in which the
dangers to clients are animate and potent and in which the smallest
wrongs can cause the greatest of harms. The Rules assume that this
perilous symbolic world is one divided into right and wrong-into truth
and falsity that can be determined objectively by someone other than the
lawyer, client, or adversary. Lawyers inhabit the Rules' symbolic world
as needed allies to their marginally capable clients. The Rules' symbolic
lawyers are, however unfortunately, themselves subject to corruption. At
the same time, symbolic lawyers possess the antidote to their corruption:
they are both capable of meaningful self-examination and prone to
engage in it. The challenge in meeting the requirements of the
chivalrous code of this symbolic world is that lawyers need the counsel
of the Rules and those who know them in order to see past their own
self-delusions to the ethical truths that will allow them to avoid
corruption. The clients in this symbolic world are not much help to
themselves and of no help to their lawyers. Though largely capable of
providing for their basic needs and understanding their lawyers, symbolic
clients are separated from many of their natural allies and are vulnerable
to substantial harm. Most importantly, however, these clients are worth a
lawyer's professional sacrifice even when, and perhaps especially when,
harm is nearly certain.
Significantly, under the Model Rules, the symbolic client's
adversaries have an equal worth. In the symbolic world of the Rules, it is
crime and fraud, not a client's adversary, which deserve to be
vanquished. Lawyers must fight with valor the symbolic contest to
defeat these wrongs because, in the end, lawyers have no claim to
infallibility in exercising their judgment. Whether one contestant or
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another prevails, lawyers must follow the symbolic code of valor if, as
their profession requires, they are to fight again. Lawyers must obey and
respect the symbolically omnipresent authority that decides the contest as
well as immanently enforces the valorous code. These conditions on law
practice create a symbolic normative economy, distinct from the worldly
economy, which is at once providential, beneficent, transformative, and
unbounded in extent and nature. Lawyers who best intuit and who most
willingly pursue this normative economy are also those who best serve
their clients while finding the most meaningful professional successshining knights rather than cunning pettifoggers within the symbolic
nature of a lawyer's professional responsibility.

